
Nigeria, Africa’s largest democracy with over 200 million people, is about to decentralise its police for the first time in over five decades. After approval by 30 of 36 state parliaments, a bill to create state police is now on the president’s desk. While many are celebrating this milestone, available facts suggest it is too early to celebrate.
It’s too early to celebrate because the anticipated law has not addressed some pertinent questions: what kind of police does Nigeria need? Is it a police institution that does the bidding of the political elite to the detriment of the vast majority of the citizens? Do we need a police institution that protects human rights or one that violates them for personal gain? Are we expecting the proliferation of underfunded institutions in the name of creating state police?
A cursory look at the State Police Bill shows it partially addresses palpable fears previously raised by opponents of a dual police structure in the country. Such fears include, but are not limited to, a likely hijack of police institutions by state governors as well as an envisaged funding gap.
Under the anticipated law, state governors are empowered to appoint state police commissioners with the confirmation of State Houses of Assembly, acting as watchdogs to check abuse of executive powers in the administrative affairs of state police institutions. The proposed legislation also provides for the establishment of State Police Service Commissions to manage recruitment and discipline to limit political interference in policing.
The mere existence of laws is not a guarantee that they would serve public interests – what matters is their application for the common good of society. Vesting oversight in state legislators is not enough. State police commissioners should not be nominated by governors alone. The commissioner should be nominated by a joint panel of the State Police Service Commission, National Police Council, a state chief judge, Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), and civil society organisations and appointed by the governor on the recommendation of that panel, subject to confirmation by two-thirds of the State House of Assembly, for a fixed single term of four years.
The current economic reality in the country also suggests that the argument on funding state police has not been adequately addressed.
Most state governments are currently contending with workers’ increasing demands for pay rise in the face of inflation. Essential social services in education and health are derelict on account of inadequate funding. Given this situation, many wonder what kind of police institutions states intend to establish.
Over the years, the debate on state police has narrowly focused on politics, ignoring the equally important social aspects. Policing shapes citizens’ lives in profound ways – affecting public safety, mental and psychological health, community trust, and daily freedoms. It places enormous powers in the hands of individuals left to use their discretion in the exercise of the authority the law vests in them. The abuse or misuse of such powers for personal gain is what amounts to police corruption.
In recognition of the fact that police corruption is universal, many crime scholars are beginning to pay a great deal of attention to fair policing, which must ensure the validity of arrests, appropriateness of shootings, and other crime prevention-related activities of the police. Most notably, the 1969 resolution of the International Chiefs of Police called for collective action and increased efforts to rid the police of rotten apples.
The rotten apple theory places the onus of corruption on the individual police officer. That is to say, it is the few rotten apples in the system that are responsible for corruption. The theory gained prominence with the findings of the Knapp Commission appointed to investigate alleged police corruption within the New York City Police Department. In its final report, the Knapp Commission recommended that any officer found guilty of corruption should be dismissed as a rotten apple that must not soil the clean barrel.
In alignment with the rotten apple theory, many crime researchers have underscored the need for proper scrutiny in police recruitments to ensure that unfit persons are not enlisted as candidates for policing. They insist that the right candidates must be educated, without criminal records, and demonstrate high ethical standards in their conduct.
In more recent times, however, other crime scholars are beginning to find the rotten apple theory inadequate for the explanation of police corruption. They would rather rely on the structural theory which holds that police corruption is systemic. The structural theory is based on the premise that organisational culture influences how decisions are made, how individuals interact, and how they share knowledge in an organisation. It argues that it is the prevailing corruption in the system that influences the individual officer, and not the other way around. Consequently, there is a tendency for a newly recruited officer with high moral standards to become corrupted by the system.
As criminal justice scholar, Frank Heley, notes in his analysis of the structural theory, those ensnared in the corruption web are not only the small spiders – they include police supervisors and chiefs. According to Heley, police corruption is encouraged or discouraged by the conduct of those at the helm of affairs. To reduce professional misconduct, he demands leadership by example and proper supervision of the rank and file to keep them in check. He also emphasises the need for periodic internal investigations as a remedy for the proliferation of the so-called rotten apples in the system.
Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Olatunji Disu recently reiterated the need for a people-centred policing which is at the core of the debate on state police. Speaking at his monthly conference with senior officers in Abuja on November 11, 2026, he observed that “ As we approach another important electoral period, I wish to emphasise that the Nigerian Police Force remains a strictly non-partisan institution. Our allegiance is to the constitution and the Nigerian people”.
That charge is altruistic, but merely addresses the symptoms of systemic shortcomings preventing policing from meeting the needs of citizens. The greater challenge lies in how the police have been designed to operate that creates room for lack of accountability to citizens, especially in matters where political interests collide with citizens’ rights.
In their operations, the police have been driven more by loyalty from the bottom to the top, than accountability to citizens. The Divisional Police Officer (DPO) refers to the Commissioner of Police who is answerable to the IGP who in turn reports to the president.
In this chain of command, the interest of a sitting president is overriding, even if it conflicts with the collective good of society. It’s an awful loyalty chain that travels down swiftly. And this is what should not be replicated with the creation of state police.
The danger of creating state police without the necessary safeguards is inherent in the transfer of an old culture of policing in the interest of a privileged few, particularly for state officials that call the shots, rather than the society as a whole.
Creating state police means decentralising policing in Nigeria. It is expected to enhance community policing through proximity. Under state police institutions, an officer who knows the terrain of a particular community well and speaks the local language, arrives at the crime scene in minutes rather than several hours it takes an officer deployed from Abuja. Proximity also means that a resident of Yenagoa, in the oil-rich Niger Delta, can approach the state police complaints commission and get results with more ease than proceeding to Abuja for the same purpose.
From the foregoing, it’s essential to decentralise police. However, it is dangerous to decentralise without creating standards to reinvent policing in Nigeria. There must be a paradigm shift from the colonial legacy of emphasising on crowd control to de-escalating a mob as a better way of crime prevention. The brand new police institutions Nigerians expect are those that should not be investigating crimes after they have been committed, but a better equipped force fully committed to crime prevention based on community intelligence. In a nutshell, we don’t need reactionary police institutions, but those that are proactive enough to nip crime in the bud to protect lives and properties.
In the final analysis, the president should withhold his assent to the proposed law on the creation of state police.The bill should go back to the National Assembly to replace the clause that empowers state governors alone to appoint police commissioners with a joint nomination clause. Allowing the bill to become law in its current form means the same loyalty compelling partisan loyalty at the centre will be replicated in states. This would distract senior officers, from DPOs to Commissioners of Police, and keep them at the beck and call of state governors.
This course of action is consistent with the provision to make state police funding seamless. The logic is clear: if he who pays the piper calls the tune, then the governor must not be the piper. Funding must therefore be a first-line charge, released automatically, not at the discretion of the governor.
Failure to address this gap in the proposed creation of state police means creating a new law that brings back old problems that could prove more difficult to fix in the near future. It amounts to refusing to make the police independent of political influences. It means perpetuating structural injustice that prevents police officers from meeting their constitutional obligations to citizens. When salary is lean and comes late, road blocks become the salary that will never disappear from Nigerian roads. It is a practical explanation for the systemic shortcomings that teaches young recruits to adopt survival strategies in the midst of structural adversities.
Nigeria is not alone in this dilemma. But many other countries are beginning to realise that decentralising policing without changing police culture only decentralises abuse.
By Tekena Amieyeofori
Dr. Amieyeofori, Journalist and Conflict Analyst, can be reached on tekena4real@gmail.com.














